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Abstract 
Over the past two decades there has been a burgeoning interest and research into 
experiments and innovations in participatory governance.  While advocates highlight 
the merits of such new governance arrangements in moving beyond traditional 
interest group representations and deepening democracy through deliberation with a 
broad range of civic associations, critics express concern about the political 
legitimacy and democratic accountability of participating associations, highlighting in 
particular the dangers of co-option and faction.  Addressing these concerns, a number 
of theorists identify an important role for civic associations in linking deliberations at 
micro policy levels to those within the public sphere more broadly.  These normative 
contributions raise an important empirical question - does civic associational 
engagement at micro levels leave scope to engage both laterally across associations 
and vertically with members and citizens more broadly?  More simply put, is civic 
associational engagement within micro-policy fora 'good' for democracy more 
broadly? 
 
Drawing from a study of civic associational engagement in Ireland‟s national Social 
Partnership process over a ten year period this paper argues that, where deliberations 
become overshadowed by more traditional communicative norms of bargaining and 
negotiation, it is not.  Evidence is presented from the Irish case to show how civic 
actors, having internalised the dominant communicative norms of the process, have 
contributed towards a narrowing of the deliberative space both within, but most 
particularly, outside this process.  This, it is argued, has resulted in a considerably 
weakened public sphere with neither the institutional apparatus nor the discursive 
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capacity to seek accountability from political and civic leaders at a time of profound 
crisis within the Irish state. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades there has been a burgeoning interest and research into 
experiments and innovations in governance at both local and national levels.  Whether 
characterised as co-governance
1
, joined-up governance
2
, multi-level governance
3
, 
network governance
4
 or participatory governance
5
, these innovative structures bring 
together the principal norms and tenets of both associative and deliberative 
democracy by opening the fields of policy to vertical and horizontal networks of civic 
associations while employing deliberation and iterative dialogue to achieve 
consensus.  The spread of these new governance arrangements has been both wide 
and deep with innovations in participatory governance associated with both public 
sector reforms and „Third Way Politics‟ across the Western world6 while similar 
arrangements underpin the good governance reforms of the 1990s in a wide range of 
developing countries
7
.   
 
Advocates highlight the merits of these governance arrangements at both instrumental 
and political levels.  Instrumentally, they are seen to lead to more effective policy as 
local partners and associations bring locally relevant information, analysis and skills 
to the table
8
.  Moreover, the norms of deliberation employed in building shared 
understanding are seen to build consensus, solidarity and social stability
9
 while the 
extension of the political space to a broader range of civic associations is described as 
deepening democracy, moving beyond traditional interest group representations and 
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deepening and extending the democratic state
10
.  These merits notwithstanding, 
concern has been expressed in relation to the perceived democratic deficit of these 
governance networks.  While for some, the weak linkages between these new forms 
of governance and the formal institutions of representative democracy constitute an 
area of concern
11
, others argue warn against the perils of both faction among
12
 and 
cooption of
13 
civic actors engaged in these processes.  Issues of the democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of participating associations are therefore to the fore for 
sceptics and critics of such processes.  Addressing these concerns, a number of 
theorists
14
 identify an important role for civic associations in linking deliberations at 
micro policy levels to those within the public sphere more broadly.  Building on the 
work of Jane Mansbridge who argues that elite deliberation must be supplemented 
with deliberation among „the rank and file‟ as ‗only citizens themselves can know 
what outcomes they want‘ 15, Caroline Hendriks proposes an „integrated deliberative 
system‟ linking micro-level deliberations to a series of communicative arenas 
fostering critical, public reflection
16
.  Independently of these theorists, Lucio Baccaro 
similarly argues that the legitimacy of micro governance arenas should be based on 
‗their capacity to pass the test of collective scrutiny‘ within an active and mobilised 
public sphere
17
.  The agents of such mediation between sites of micro-deliberation 
and the broad public are located by all theorists within civil society.  Herein lies the 
dilemma however.  While, in theory, civic associations represent a key mediation 
point between the broad public and the state, enhancing democracy through their 
participation across the deliberative system at both micro and macro levels and in the 
intervening spaces in between, in practice, their collective capacity to sustain 
engagement at all levels remains understudied.  In a paper examining the link between 
 4 
associational and neo-corporatist models, Lucio Baccaro poses the question 
succinctly.   
 It is highly likely that modern democracies need both a civil society of the 
 Habermasian kind, which controls from outside the formal structures of 
 government specialized in the resolution of practical problems, and a civil 
 society of the associational democratic kind, which participates directly in 
 problem-solving. What we need to understand at this point— and the question 
 is not just theoretical but eminently empirical—is whether such duplicity of 
 functions is sustainable: whether civil society is able to regenerate itself 
 constantly and smoothly, so that for each organization that accedes to the 
 bureaucratic circuit another emerges to take its place in the unstructured 
 public sphere, or whether the transition of civil society associations from the 
 ‗lifeworld‘ to the ‗system‘ of an enlarged bureaucracy (Habermas, 1987) does 
 not deteriorate their capacity for critique and articulation of value-based 
 alternatives.
 18
 
 
Through an examination of civic associational engagement within Ireland‟s national 
Social Partnership process, a process variously characterised as a form of „network 
governance‟19 and „an Irish version of Third Way politics‟20, this paper interrogates 
this question more fully.  The paper employs an actor-oriented approach to analysis 
which focuses on the experiences, analyses and perceptions of state and civic 
associational participants within the process.  The findings presented draw on twenty 
two interviews conducted from 2005 to 2007 with state and civic actors participating 
within the process.  These include representatives from eighteen of the twenty three 
„community and voluntary‟ organisations involved as well as four of the most senior 
civil servants involved in deliberation, negotiation and administration of the process
21
.  
While this research was originally conducted as part of a broader research project 
comparing Ireland and Malawi‟s processes as cases of globalised governance22, a new 
analysis of the Irish data within the framework of deliberative theory – inspired by the 
rapidly changed Irish context – reveals important issues for deliberative actors and 
theorists alike.  The research is complemented by an analysis of successive Social 
Partnership strategies and background policy documentation.  The analysis presented 
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highlights fundamental challenges posed by the superimposition of deliberation on 
more traditional communicative norms of bargaining and negotiation and it is argued 
that civic actors, having internalised the dominant, more traditional communicative 
norms of the process, have contributed to a narrowing of the deliberative space both 
within, but most particularly, outside this process.  Over time, as an increasing 
number of national civic associations have entered the process, civil society outside 
has been left with little leadership to re-animate the public sphere.  The result, it is 
argued, is a weakened public sphere with neither the institutional apparatus nor the 
discursive capacity to seek accountability from political and civic leaders at a time of 
profound crisis within the Irish state. 
 
The argument is developed as follows.  Within the context of an extensive literature 
examining the concurrence of Ireland‟s Social Partnership process with the emergence 
of the economically vibrant „Celtic Tiger‟ economy of the 1990s, and given the 
massive economic, social and political crisis now facing the country and its people, 
the following section argues the case for a re-orientation in focus toward the 
implications of the process for substantive democracy within the country more 
broadly.  This re-orientation is next theorised through an examination of the 
normative ideals, critiques and responses to these of the inter-related theories of 
associative and deliberative democracy.  The issues raised provide a framework for 
the third section wherein state and civic associational involvement in the Irish process 
are examined.  Turning to Ireland‟s deepening crisis, the paper concludes with a 
discussion of the lessons – both of a practical and of a theoretical nature – drawn from 
the process.   
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Social Partnership: Ireland’s experiment in participatory governance 
Ireland‟s Social Partnership began in the late 1980s in an effort to address the 
economic crisis then facing the country.  Although initially developed around a solid 
corporatist core comprising capital, labour, farmers‟ organisations (organised into 
three respective „pillars‟) and the state to negotiate and agree wage levels, thereby 
promoting industrial stability and a climate attractive to foreign investment, from the 
outset the process also included a wide range of non-pay aspects, including policies 
on tax reform, the evolution of welfare payments, trends in health spending, and 
structural adjustments
23
.  Over the course of over twenty years, both the policy remit 
and the range of actors involved have increased substantially, moving the process a 
significant distance from its corporatist roots.  The inclusion, in the mid-1990s, of a 
fourth pillar, the „community and voluntary pillar‟ (CV pillar) comprising some 
seventeen national associational networks
24
, described by the state as widening and 
deepening participation within the process
25
,  marked an important step in Ireland‟s 
move towards participatory governance.  A fifth „environmental pillar‟, made up of 
twenty-seven environmental associations, joined the process in 2009.  Both these 
pillars, comprising national networks with extensive associational memberships 
throughout the country, have brought a large cross-section of civic associations into 
the Partnership process.  Simultaneously, many of these same associations are 
engaged in parallel processes directly through locally based partnership structures – 
the principle model for policy making at local levels since the 1990s
26
.  The extent of 
the spread of participatory governance throughout the country, engaging community 
based associations both directly and indirectly through their representative networks, 
raises an important question as to the impact (if any) of these processes on 
associational life across the country more broadly. 
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Notwithstanding the significant expansion and development of Social Partnership, 
analysis and commentary on the national process has, for the most part, centred on its 
function as an integral part of the country‟s macroeconomic framework and, with a 
focus on the traditional core of state, labour and unions, its role in building and 
consolidating the „Celtic Tiger‟.  Opinion is divided within the literature between 
analysts who celebrate the process‟ role in securing industrial stability, attracting 
foreign investment and stimulating growth
27
 and those who highlight the lack of 
socially progressive outcomes
28
 together with the growth in income inequality over 
the Social Partnership period
29
.   A comprehensive critique of the process as 
privileging capital over income equality and social justice comes from Kieran Allen
30
 
who focuses on the rise of the „working poor‟ and the role of trade unions in the 
process.  Taking a more globalised perspective and drawing on Castells‟ conception 
of the „network state‟31, elsewhere this author has argued that the process has 
functioned as an important political instrument in expanding and consolidating a 
Gramscian integral state, nurturing and promoting engagement across civil society 
more broadly in managing the social fallout accruing from the costs of the state‟s 
project of global economic integration
32
.  To a lesser extent, some attention has also 
been directed at both the deliberative nature of the process (although this 
characterisation remains somewhat vague and undertheorised)
33
 and, with weak 
linkages to the parliament and its institutions, its implications for (liberal) 
representative democracy
34
.   
 
An area which has received far less attention from scholars and commentators 
however, and the focus of this article, is the political significance of the process more 
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broadly, most notably in relation to its implications for broader macro deliberations 
within the public sphere and the health and vibrancy of associational life across the 
country.  While a small group of theorists
35
 argue that civic associations have been 
co-opted into the process thereby failing to exert any real influence therein, these 
assertions lack solid empirical bases and we remain unclear as to why or how this 
may have happened (if indeed it has).   At an empirical level, significant questions 
remain, therefore, in relation to the agency of civic associational networks within the 
community and voluntary pillar in the process
36
.  At a more theoretical level, the 
reality of participatory governance on the ground in many guises throughout the 
country, together with the high level of civic associational involvement this entails, 
provides a good case from which to interrogate normative proposals and suggestions 
for civic associational agency in linking macro and micro deliberative spheres.  It is to 
these proposals, and their significance in relation to Ireland‟s national process that we 
now turn.   
 
Associations, deliberation and democracy: Theorising Social 
Partnership 
 
While many global commentators source the origins of partnership governance 
arrangements within the discourse of the public reforms of the 1990s
37
 with, as we 
have seen, scholars of the Irish process situating their analyses within labour relations 
theory, the emphasis on deliberation and consensus linked to the role ascribed to civic 
associations as state „partners‟ in economic and social development point to deeper 
linkages to both associative and deliberative democracy.   
 
Although debates on the nature, role and function of civil society broadly and civic 
associations more specifically date back to the seventeenth century
38
, the 1990s 
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brought about a vigorous revival in interest in the field, most notably in relation to the 
role of civic associations in democracy.  Two key trends appear to have promoted this 
revival.  The first is the role of civic associations worldwide in mobilising the so-
called „Third Wave‟ of democracy that swept through Eastern Europe, Latin America 
and Africa in the early 1990s, while the second is the context of falling voter turnout 
and growing apathy with liberal representative institutions in the West.  Inspired by 
these developments, two broad schools of thought have emerged in relation to the role 
of associations and their relations with the state.  The first envisages a civic 
associational space critical of and separate to both market and state while the second, 
theorised most comprehensively as a model of „associative democracy‟, envisages 
associations working in partnership with the state. 
 
In one of the most significant contributions to the 1990s debate on the role of civic 
associations in democracy, Cohen and Arato
39
 advocate a model in which civic 
associations promote democracy through their animation of the public sphere, 
ensuring vibrant debate and deliberation among civil society at large, with this, 
through association‟s „dual role‟, in turn feeding into political deliberations and 
decision making at more formal levels.  The authors draw heavily on Habermas‟ 
notion of a „communicative / discourse ethics‟ wherein the public sphere is depicted 
as a site of rational critical deliberation among free and equal citizens employing 
deliberative norms which are inclusive, reasoned and reflective, and aimed at reaching 
common understanding and consensus
40
.   Habermas argues that unconstrained 
communication is made possible by civil society organisations which periodically 
renew the political debate and force the official circuits of power to be attentive and 
responsive to new issues arising at the periphery of the system.  Following Habermas, 
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for Cohen and Arato
41
, ‗The political role of civil society in turn is not directly related 
to the control or conquest of power but to the generation of influence through the life 
of democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public 
sphere.‘  The role of civic associations, following this conception, is to open up public 
spaces for more inclusive, broader deliberation and debate on issues of public interest 
and concern.   
 
While this conception invokes a deliberative space open to all, it is not without its 
critics for whom Habermas and his followers deliver an overly rationalist conception 
of the public sphere which, despite claims that it makes room for difference, fails to 
adequately theorise pluralism and power.  Specifically, critics argue that the norms of 
rational discourse with their deliberative emphasis on communicative reason and 
consensus ignore the pluralist and inevitably conflictual nature of society
42
 and 
exclude individuals and groups for whom more emotive, less bounded and less 
rational forms of communication are the norm
43
 thus reinforcing and reproducing 
existing exclusions and inequalities as powerful actors come to dominate the public 
sphere
44
.  The influence of these different critiques on deliberative theory is apparent 
in recent work with theorists, appreciating the legitimacy of differing opinions and 
positions, advocating more pluralist conceptions of the public sphere (see for example 
Benhabib‟s argument that a civic perspective of „enlarged mentality‟ suffices in the 
absence of consensus
45
, or Dryzek and Niemeyers‟ proposed concept of „meta-
consensus‟ which recognises the legitimacy of different values and positions46).  
Thus, contemporary debates, cognisant of the multiplicity of positions and proposals, 
envisage a role for civic associations in animating the public sphere in a way which 
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ensures that communications are not distorted by powerful voices and interests and 
that a diversity of positions, interests and perspectives are expressed. 
 
The second major contribution to the debate on associations and democracy advocates 
a model where associations work in partnership with the state in a more formal 
deliberative role in the arena of economic and social policy and service delivery. 
Several variants on this model have been proposed.  Hirst‟s proposal is for a radical 
transformation of public and private spheres whereby the state cedes key economic 
and social functions to civic associations
47
 with civic associations, following this 
conception, playing a role in both policy formulation and implementation in 
partnership with, although autonomous to, the state.  Cohen and Rogers‟ 
recommendations for a closer relationship between associations and states to address 
the shortcomings of the welfare state
48 
resonate with those proposed by Hirst.   In line 
with the instrumental arguments of governance proponents, Cohen and Rogers argue 
that associations can help improve policy formulation and implementation by 
leveraging local knowledge, encouraging compliance to policy and monitoring 
outcomes.  Fung and Wright propose a third variant on this theme.  Their proposals 
for what they call Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) see associations 
pushing for institutional reforms wherein individuals may directly participate with 
state actors in deliberation and policy formulation at local levels.  The benefits of such 
arrangements, they argue, are reciprocal, with associations providing channels for 
individual voices while the direct opportunities to influence policy and state action 
creates incentives for individuals to create and maintain associations
49
.   
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In Ireland, the key government policy document setting out the relationship of the 
state to civic associations reflects strongly these basic principles of associative 
democracy.  Within this document, the State is described as „not the answer to every 
problem, but just one player among others‘, with the government‟s vision of society 
described as being „one which encourages people and communities to look after their 
own needs – very often in partnership with statutory agencies – but without depending 
on the state to meet all needs‟. Thus, policies and action priorities should be based on 
local knowledge and, in line with the proposals of a number of associative democrats, 
the Irish government recommends that the contribution of associations to policy and 
service provision be supported financially
50
.   
 
As with the first model discussed, a number of problems with these normative 
associative models have been identified.  These may be summarised into the „what‟ 
and the „who‟ of representation within these formal, micro-level deliberative fora.  
The „what‟ problem raises questions regarding which issues to include and how to 
deliberate upon these.  Both Schmitter
51
 and Young
52
 are sharply critical of European 
models of associative democracy in that, they argue, only distributional issues are 
included with all other non-materialist issues remaining exempt.  The „who‟ problem 
relates to the „faction‟ problem common within traditional interest group politics – 
that of incomplete representation and self-serving behaviour.  As in traditional interest 
group politics, civic associations are likely to represent the specific interests of their 
members, and not those of society more broadly.  Two aspects of this problem are of 
particular concern here.  First, there is the problem of equality of representation.  Well 
resourced groups coalescing around specific issues are generally more powerful and 
therefore more successful in attaining their interests than more marginalised 
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groupings with broader concerns.  As Fung notes „In political science and political 
sociology, group research has consistently shown that ―the flaw in the pluralist 
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with an upper class accent‖‟53.  And second, 
as Hirst and Bader
54
 note, civic associations as self-governing entities may withdraw 
from the wider community they purport to represent, seeking to control their members 
through the services that they provide – a problem of oligarchy and a lack of internal 
democracy.  Far from meditating and representing members‟ interests, associations 
may become institutions of social control.   
 
Cohen and Rogers (1995), recognising that all associations may not automatically be 
„public spirited‟, propose two solutions.  First, they envisage a level of state 
intervention to curb factional interests and centralise and stimulate „a deliberate 
politics of association‘ to equalise interest representation or make associations more 
public-spirited or „other-regarding‟55.  Thus, states may intervene to ensure 
accountability of group leadership to members, the representativeness (or 
„encompassingness‟ as they term it) of the group relative to affected populations and 
their modes of interaction with other groups – by selecting the civic actors to be 
involved.  Second, Cohen and Rogers
56
, together with a number of other theorists
57
 
highlight the importance of linking deliberations at micro policy levels with those at 
more macro levels within the public sphere more broadly.   
 
Associations therefore, in theory represent a key mediation point between the broad 
public and the state, enhancing democracy through their participation across the 
deliberative system.  At a micro, formal level, they can represent the interests, ideas, 
analyses and positions of „the people‟ affected by particular policy processes and 
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decisions.  At a macro, informal level, they can facilitate public deliberation by 
opening the space for a diversity of voices, views, interests and positions.  And, in the 
intervening spaces in between, they can improve the quality and equality of political 
representation by making the link between informal and formal arenas, opening 
channels for individuals to hold their political leaders accountable, mobilise where 
necessary and press their public concerns.  The key question is to what extent do civic 
associations succeed in promoting such deliberation across these multiple fora?  Or 
more specifically, does their engagement at a micro level leave scope to engage 
laterally across associations and vertically with members and citizens more broadly?  
This question is explored below through an examination of the community and 
voluntary pillar‟s engagement in Ireland‟s national Social Partnership process.   
 
 
Deliberation and Democracy within Ireland’s Social Partnership 
As we have seen, the shift to a more associative model within Ireland‟s national 
Social Partnership process formally came about in 1996 when, following some 
pressure from a number of civic interest groups, the Irish state invited eight civic 
networks into the process to form a new „community and voluntary pillar‟58.  While 
some networks had applied to be involved
59
, others were invited.  Networks targeted 
for invitation by the state were key umbrella groups for particular sectors with 
sizeable constituencies of interest
60
.  The Community Workers Cooperative (CWC), 
interested in gaining broader-based representation, went on to form the Community 
Platform, an amalgam of initially seventeen small national associations (although 
membership has fluctuated up and down over time).   
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Notwithstanding their commonalities as key national civic associational networks 
with wide membership bases, from the outset there were clear differences between 
participant groups.  First, there were divisions between issue-based/single 
constituency groups focused on securing specific policy gains and broader-based 
groups interested in engaging in more open deliberative dialogue with other 
participants.  Specifically, with a doubling of EU Structural Funds in 1989, leading to 
a total investment in Ireland over the period 1989 to 1999 of Euro 11 billion
61
, for a 
number of interest-based associations, engagement in the process was about ‗shaping 
the social agenda and where resources are going to be placed…‘62, while for others it 
was more about opening up dialogue and debate.  Second, there were divisions 
between welfare-type approaches to social inclusion focusing solely on distributional 
issues, as advocated by particular religious associations, and associations aiming for 
broader structural change.  Third, there were also divisions in relation to 
communication norms, with some associations from the outset stressing a rational, 
„professional‟ approach in the Habermasian sense, yet others favouring wider 
methods of communication including protest and contestation.  And fourth, although 
many participant associations worked through extensive constituent networks 
comprising hundreds of locally based associations, there were clear differences in 
relation to the size and capacity of participant groups at national level.  The average 
estimate of human resource requirements for participation within the process is one 
person full-time
63
, with this intensifying during negotiation periods leading up to 
agreement on final strategies.  While some organisations employed one-two dedicated 
policy officers, others employed just one-two staff overall.  Participation in the 
process thus drew heavily on limited resources and many civic participants noted that 
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ties with their constituencies have suffered as a consequence of the exigencies of 
participation in the process.   
 
As we have seen, for advocates of participatory or network governance the key 
benefits for the state include more effective policies together with increased social 
cohesion and stability.  While senior state officials appear somewhat ambivalent in 
relation to the policy expertise of participant associations, there is no doubt that their 
engagement has brought a legitimacy to both the process and its outcomes.  And with 
associational networks extending throughout the country at local level, this legitimacy 
has the potential to reach far and wide.  As a senior state official involved notes 
„…there is an aspect of legitimacy which derives from their [civic associations‟] 
involvement.  In a sense, the concern with fairness in the broader sense in the 
agreement is a good element to have in terms of the wider public understanding and 
acceptance of the outcomes of these negotiations… We would have found 
restructuring the economy much more problematic, much more conflictual, much less 
successful without it.‘64 
 
The Social Partnership model therefore, as conceived by both state and civic actors at 
the outset, represented a hybrid of both associative democratic and corporatist models.  
Its associative democratic influences are apparent in both the state‟s and civic actors‟ 
own „selection‟ of a diverse range of associations, while the state‟s particular focus on 
sectoral interest-based or single-issue groups belies its corporatist roots, increasing the 
scope for faction.  Of particular interest in this paper is the nature and quality of 
deliberation within and without the process and its impact on faction among 
participant associations.   
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Deliberation within Social Partnership 
As we have seen, one of the key features of deliberation is its potential to address, to 
some degree, the problem of faction by facilitating a sharing of views and a 
transformation of preferences.  The aim is to build shared understandings, solidarity 
and consensus on policy direction moving forward.  However, within this section we 
see that Ireland‟s Social Partnership process, through its institutional design, its 
dominant communicative norms and its pressure to reach consensus across diverse 
civic interest groups mitigates against this, with problems of both faction and 
deliberation increasing over time.   
 
The Social Partnership process comprises both a range of sectoral pillars and a 
complex set of institutions, both formal and informal – each with overlapping but 
specific remits feeding into the final policy strategy.  Pillar members are expected to 
work with colleagues within their own pillar to produce consensus policy proposals 
and positions.  Pillar representatives then present and promote these at different fora 
within the process.  At a broad level, the National Economic and Social Forum 
(NESF) is the institution which brings together up to fifteen invited representatives 
from the community and voluntary pillar together with fifteen representatives from 
each of the other pillars as well as a variable number of parliamentary representatives 
and independent specialists to deliberate upon and input to reports in broad areas of 
social inclusion which may inform relevant policy on an ongoing basis.  Since its 
inception in 1993, the NESF has produced thirty-nine reports on different areas of 
social policy.  In March 2010, the institution was amalgamated into the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC).  The NESC, in operation since 1973 and 
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therefore predating Social Partnership, is identified by all actors as the pivotal 
institution in the process as this, the state‟s principal advisory body, is responsible for 
producing a strategy document which sets out the parameters under which the 
subsequent negotiation and bargaining phase is conducted.  Comprising a sub-set of 
participants from each of the pillars (5 representatives from each), the NESC is 
designed to provide an open deliberative space aimed at reaching what its Director 
describes as a „shared understanding‘ on key economic and social issues drawing on 
inputs from its participants.  In recent years the NESC has focused on addressing the 
growing crisis in social services which accompanied the period of rapid economic 
growth through a problem-solving approach with social partners.  In parallel with this 
key forum, pillar members meet separately within their own pillar to analyse and 
prepare joint positions on and responses to draft papers emanating from the NESC 
secretariat.  The frequency and intensity of both NESC and pillar meetings increase 
considerably in the months leading up to the final bilateral negotiations between pillar 
members and state representatives.  This third official stage of the process, referred to 
by all as the „negotiation‟ phase, is where deliberation ceases and pillar 
representatives engage in separate bilateral, intensive negotiations with state officials 
in attempts to maximise policy (and budgetary) outcomes.  It is at this point that the 
corporatist wage and tax deals are negotiated with employer and union pillars whilst 
separate civic actors‟ negotiations focus solely on the core aspects of social policy set 
out in the NESC strategy.  This negotiation phase can take anything from a number of 
weeks to a number of months as the classic instruments of bargaining and negotiation 
come into play.  In parallel to these official fora, ad hoc unofficial meetings also take 
place between strategic actors and state officials in efforts to progress specific 
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organisations‟ interests.  Table 1 below synopsises the purpose and composition of 
these main fora. 
 
Table I: Social Partnership institutions, their purpose and their participants 
Institution Participants Purpose 
National Economic and Social 
Forum (NESF) – established in 
1993 – meetings are ongoing 
- Up to 15 reps from CV pillar 
(generally variable) 
- 15 reps from each of 3 other 
strands – Parliament; employer-
trade union- farmer; and central-
local government-independents 
respectively 
 - NESF staff 
To deliberate upon and draw up 
reports in broad areas of social 
inclusion which may inform 
relevant policy 
National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC) – established in 
1973 – meetings are ongoing 
- 5 reps from CV pillar 
- NESC staff 
-  2 reps from Prime Minister‟s 
department 
- 10 government nominees 
To deliberate upon and draw up 
the strategy which sets the 
parameters for the subsequent 
negotiations 
Negotiations leading to 4
th
 
strategy, Partnership 2000 
(happened in 1997) 
All CV pillar members meet in a 
„separate room‟ with state 
officials who also meet 
separately with members of 
other pillars 
To negotiate social policy 
commitments for inclusion in 
the subsequent strategy 
Negotiations leading to 5
th
 
strategy, Programme for 
Prosperity and Fairness 
(happened in 2000) 
 
All CV pillar members meet in a 
„separate room‟ with state 
officials who also meet 
separately with members of 
other pillars 
To negotiate social policy 
commitments for inclusion in 
the subsequent strategy 
Negotiations leading to 6
th
 
strategy, Sustaining Progress 
(happened in 2003) 
All CV pillar members meet in a 
„separate room‟ with state 
officials who also meet 
separately with members of 
other pillars 
To negotiate social policy 
commitments for inclusion in 
the subsequent strategy 
Negotiations leading to 7
th
 
strategy, Towards 2016 
(happened in 2006) 
All CV pillar members 
(including 9 new members) 
To negotiate social policy 
commitments for inclusion in 
the subsequent strategy 
Monitoring committee / 
Steering group (post 2003 on)  
5 reps of the CV pillar Regular meetings (every 1 to 3 
months) to track implementation 
of Social Partnership 
agreements 
Bilateral meetings with key state 
officials (ad hoc unofficial 
meetings determined by 
officials) 
Representatives of specific 
associations - as agreed by state 
officials 
To input to specific policies in 
line with sectoral interests 
Quarterly plenaries (nominally 
every three months, generally 
happen less frequently) 
All members of CV pillar meet 
with all members of other pillars 
Formal sessions where state 
reports on progress of 
agreement 
Other policy fora and working 
committees (increasingly all 
national level policy processes 
have been  linked to Social 
Partnership) 
Very variable – Representatives 
either elected by CV pillar 
members or invited by state 
officials 
To input to state policy in 
specific areas – some directly 
arising from SP agreement, 
others formed directly by state 
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Within the context of these multiple fora, four features of the process have served in 
particular to increase factional politics and self-serving behaviour among civic actors 
over time with the result that interest-based politics has tended to trump deliberation 
as time has evolved.  The first is the fact that, with both the NESF and NESC 
comprising a select number of representatives of each pillar and the final phase 
negotiations taking place on a bilateral basis through the so-called „separate rooms‟ 
mechanism, the opportunities for face-to-face deliberations across all pillars are rare.  
As Table 1 illustrates, the only opportunity for all participants from all pillars to come 
together is during the quarterly plenaries (which in reality are reported as happening 
once to twice a year).  These meetings are described by participants as „largely set 
pieces‘ where formal speeches are delivered with little or no opportunity for cross-
deliberations.  Civic actors report that most of their time has been spent in meetings 
with counterparts within their own pillar negotiating agreed pillar positions rather 
than deliberating with other actors.  With meetings with members of other pillars rare, 
and competition for places within other fora (together with all-important informal 
bilateral meetings with state officials) fierce, opportunities and incentives to work 
toward shared understandings and transform preferences across sectoral interests are 
reported to have been few.   
 
The second related feature is the requirement that the CV pillar produce consensus 
positions and proposals on a wide range of social policy issues.  These consensus 
positions are then brought forward by a select number of pillar representatives to 
different institutions within the process (e.g. the NESC, the formal bilateral meetings 
or various working committees).  With members seeking to push their own particular 
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sectoral interests, civic actors report that most of their time has been spent 
„negotiating within the pillar‟ in an effort to push their particular agendas as well as 
secure places within other key fora.  The time commitment for engagement within the 
pillar alone has been significant and, as we will see, the pressures to reach consensus 
has led to growing antagonism and conflict within the pillar over time. 
 
A third feature is the communication norms promoted throughout the process, 
together with the range of issues up for discussion.  The corporatist roots of the 
process have already been noted.  While Ireland‟s process has been described as 
combining a mix of bargaining, negotiation and deliberation
65
, as we have seen, the 
deliberative component is largely restricted to the NESF and NESC fora, while 
traditional corporatist norms of bargaining and negotiation dominate the all-important 
later phase.  This is apparent from the naming of this latter phase – the „negotiations‟, 
as well as from participants descriptions of communication being ‗hard-nosed‘ and 
‗macho‘, navigable by „playing hardball‘ in „a kind of culture of negotiations that 
suits the unions‘ but not all civic actors.66.   As one of the senior state officials notes 
„It always comes down to deal-making… this is about the craft of negotiation, deal-
making… You either can do it or you can‘t.67‘  
 
A fourth feature of the process, again revealing its corporatist underpinnings, is the 
decision-making process which, largely taking place within informal, hidden arenas, 
is characterised by one civic actor as a mechanism of „horse-trading‟68.  Civic actors 
are under no illusions as to their distance from the decision-making processes.  As 
another notes „Don‘t make any mistake. We all bid in our stuff, but the scribes are in 
[the Department of an] Taoiseach‘s98, or in whatever Department, or with influence 
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from other places.  So what comes back to you as a draft is their hand with never 
enough of what you‘ve put in…‘70.  All civic actors note that the decisions are made 
elsewhere, in other rooms, with other actors.   
 
These key features of the process have, over time, combined to produce a heady mix 
of frustration, antagonism and animosity among and between civic actors.  While 
civic actors note that an interest in building solidarity and shaping a social agenda 
together was certainly a feature at the outset in the mid-1990s – most particularly for 
the Community Workers Cooperative which formed a broader-based Community 
Platform with this in mind – their appetite for collective work has certainly waned 
over time and increased fragmentation rather than cohesion has come to characterise 
the civic pillar, with factional politics now predominating.  Both state and civic 
actors‟ responses to an inevitable split within the pillar in 2003 following a 
particularly difficult round of negotiations reflect a hardening in attitudes and a 
narrowing of communicative norms both within and outside of the process. 
 
Following the publication of the 2003 agreement, both the Community Platform – led 
by the Community Worker‟s Cooperative – and the NWCI publicly refused to endorse 
it on the basis that it offered nothing to their respective constituencies.  While there 
has never been a formal ratification requirement for Social Partnership agreements, 
both the term itself (agreement as opposed to strategy), and the unwritten codes of 
conduct that surround it, imply endorsement of resultant strategies by all.  The 
Platform and NWCI‟s rejection of the 2003 agreement (or non-agreement as it thus 
was), although it attracted sparse media coverage and failed to generate wider public 
debate on either the process or the issues, nonetheless appears to have perturbed both 
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the state and remaining CV pillar members alike in that, signalling what Mouffe
71
 
would regard as false consensus, it undermined both the legitimacy of the process and 
that of its participants.  This is evidenced in the consequences for the dissenting 
parties who were, in their own words, ‗severely punished‘, by state and remaining CV 
pillar members alike.   
 
This punishment took two forms.  First, dissenting associations were removed by the 
state from the process.  Having lost their social partner status, they then found 
themselves ostracised not just from fora relating to the partnership process, but from a 
wide range of other policy fora also (for example consultative committees on specific 
social policy issues, bilateral meetings with officials).  It was becoming clear to civic 
actors that Social Partnership had become the gateway into all other national level 
policy fora, whether formally linked to the process or not.  Moreover, dissenting 
parties found themselves isolated, not just by state actors, but by remaining civic 
participants themselves, being denied access to or information on policy 
developments by their own colleagues.  As one civic representative notes, ‗…what‘s 
interesting is that some of the groups that stayed in the [CV] pillar… would be even 
more punitive than the state itself, more exclusionary than the state itself.‟72.  And 
second, their core state funding and hence survival was jeopardised.  Following the 
Cohen and Rogers‟ model, many civic associations in Ireland are predominantly state 
funded.  In 2005 this state funding accounted for 74.5 per cent of non-profit 
organisational income
73
.  Following its rejection of the 2003 agreement, all state 
funding to the Community Workers Cooperative was cut resulting in the loss of two 
out of four of its staff.  In contrast, two existing and one new CV pillar member 
received once-off grants of between Euro 50,000 and Euro 250,000 in both 2003 and 
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2004
74
.  From 2006 on, funding of Euro 10 million per annum has been made 
available to CV pillar members for ‗costs arising from contributing to evidence-based 
policy making, over and above normal activities and programmes‘75.  Facing financial 
challenges and left in something of a policy wilderness, both the NWCI and the 
Community Platform, led once more by the Community Workers Cooperative, in 
early 2007 agreed to rejoin the process. Both were promised Euro 55,000 per annum 
state funding for their participation.  In addition, at the state‟s invite, nine other 
sectoral associations joined the civic pillar in 2007 and an additional pillar comprising 
twenty seven environmental associations was created in 2009.   
 
Clearly the stakes are high and the pressures to conform to the narrow communicative 
parameters of the process and retain or regain social partner status are considerable.  
This is not lost on remaining civic actors who, despite growing factionalism and a loss 
in appetite for cooperation, appear determined to present a rational, consensual front.  
A disciplining (in a Foucauldian sense) element has entered the pillar, where there is 
no longer any room for groups not committed to a problem-solving discourse 
employing what have become the normative communicative methods of „reasonable‟ 
evidenced-based argumentation.  Any other communicative approach, as articulated 
by one new pillar member below, is now perceived as knocking the process, dragging 
down pillar members, and demonstrating a lack of respect for the process and its 
participants. „I suppose I have no difficulty for any organisations coming in once 
they‘re coming in for the right reasons, and not to knock the whole process and not to 
drag us all down…  It‘s a lot about attitude as well of people.  I think the Community 
and Voluntary Platform could make a very positive role in partnership once it doesn‘t 
try to unbalance the respect that we‘ve built up‘.76 
 25 
 
This determination to present a professional, consensual front notwithstanding, 
factional politics prevails and the appetite for collective, cooperative engagement has 
certainly dissipated.  A number of civic representatives now speak of expending far 
less energy on trying to work collectively.  One representative, reflecting on evolving 
relations within the pillar, puts it succinctly, „Because I think it‘s very clear, as much 
as we are democratic within the pillar, as much as we have worked to make a pillar 
position, this is not a consensus game.  This is not a cooperation game.  Every one of 
the fifteen of us is out for our own agenda and we really couldn‘t give a hoot about 
the others.‘ 77  
 
Thus, the civic pillar, following some ten years engagement in the process, emerges as 
a somewhat more homogenous entity, rational and professional in conduct yet 
determined to unilaterally fight for rather than change specific sectoral preferences.  
Clearly this has had significant implications for deliberations within the process – but 
what of deliberations and engagements with constituents and citizens more broadly in 
a more integrated deliberative system as advocated by contemporary theorists? 
          
Deliberation outside of Social Partnership 
With an increasing number of civic networks entering the process in recent years, it is 
particularly striking that the level of public debate and scrutiny of the process and its 
civic actors has declined significantly.  While the process received considerable 
attention in its earlier years, with civic actors engaging media specialists to gain 
coverage in the national media and raise debate within the public sphere in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the dearth of media coverage and public debate on the CV 
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pillars‟ contributions during and beyond the 2006 deliberations stands in marked 
contrast to these earlier years.  This is due to the norm of confidentiality which 
increasingly imbues the process.  As a senior state official notes, „I suppose we would 
also expect… a degree of observance of the no surprises principle‘78 meaning that 
everything should be dealt with internally rather than generating any external debate 
on relevant issues. This has clearly been communicated in subtle ways to participants. 
 
There‘s definitely a confidentiality anyway and I suppose you have to monitor 
that reasonably as well. There‘s probably a level of discretion.  But there‘s 
also a spirit of the agreement, or a spirit of Social Partnership, which says ... 
‗we‘d rather you talk to us than go public‘. Or they [state officials] may not 
say it, but you‘ll know it from body language, people not returning your calls, 
people being snotty.
79
        
        
Thus, the communicative norms within the process have had a significant impact on 
deliberations within the broader public sphere.  With practically all of the main 
nationally based civic networks now engaged, or in some cases, re-engaged in the 
process, and with norms of confidentiality actively promoted by state and civic actors 
alike, the public space for reflection, debate and critical scrutiny has been 
considerable weakened. This is exacerbated by the weak linkages between many civic 
actors and their own constituencies as they report that the exigencies of the 
negotiations and deliberations within the process have drawn on their limited 
resources.  Indeed, it is noteworthy that, when questioned in 2007 about their lack of 
media work, a number of members of the civic pillar regarded the media as a lobbying 
tool, rather than as a mechanism for mobilising popular debate. Thus it was deemed 
important to use it judiciously so as not to „upset‟ colleagues in the process.  In the 
words of one pillar member, „…you need to be careful not to use it [the media] too 
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often.  One, you upset the other organisations in the negotiations if you don‘t manage 
it right.  Two you upset the civil servants…You need to be careful‘80.   
 
It would appear that, contrary to the norms of the integrated deliberative system 
advocated by a number of deliberative theorists, as increasing numbers of associations 
enter the micro level policy circuit and both internalise and promote its narrow 
communicative norms among co-actors and constituent networks alike, civic 
associational agency within the public sphere is increasingly impoverished and the 
space for scrutiny, critique and the articulation of alternatives all but shut down.  In 
co-dependent relationships with the state – both financially and in terms of their 
increasingly specialised policy remit, and with little support from a considerably 
weakened public sphere, civic associations appear to have little choice but to remain 
inside.  This has led to a sclerosis in both the process itself and in governance and 
democracy more broadly raising important questions in relation to the overall 
democratic viability of the process.   
 
Conclusion - The politics of deliberative democracy 
September 29
th
, 2008 is a date now etched into the mind of every Irish citizen.  On 
this date, with neither public nor parliamentary consultation, a handful of senior state 
officials signed a blanket guarantee to transfer the rapidly rising debt of all Irish 
privately owned banks to the public.  As the bailout costs escalated (current estimates 
put the final cost at Euro 5 billion ($5 trillion) although the ultimate limit is anybody‟s 
guess) and a budget crisis loomed, again with neither public or parliamentary 
consultation, on November 29
th
, 2010, officials signed a structural adjustment loan of 
Euro 85 billion ($8.5 trillion) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
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European Central Bank (ECB) to cover immediate costs of the bailout.  The quid pro 
quo is a commitment to public expenditure cuts totalling Euro 10 billion ($1 trillion) 
together with tax hikes to the tune of Euro 5 billion ($ 500 billion).  
 
Spectacular as these events and figures appear, possibly the most remarkable aspect in 
all of this – and one noted by a number of international onlookers - has been the 
paucity of both debate and action within the public sphere in the face of such 
devastation.  Michael Lewis, writing in early 2011 that ―For two years they [the Irish 
people] have laboured under this impossible burden with scarcely a peep of protest‖81 
highlights the stark contrast of the Irish public‟s reaction to that of the Greek and 
Icelandic peoples‟.  Indeed, the only notable expression of public anger remains 
somewhat ambivalent – a replacement of one centre-right coalition with another in 
national elections held in February 2011.  Why the apparent passivity? Is it that the 
Irish public does not understand what has happened, what their political leaders have 
foisted upon them?  Far from it.  With public discourse – within the media and 
beyond – dominated by talk of international markets, subordinated debt and capital 
flight, the public has become expert in the vagaries and nuances of the international 
bond markets.  However, in the absence of alternative discourses, voices and interests 
across this same public sphere, appeasing the international markets is the only option, 
the sole focus.  The diversity of positions, interests and opinions central to 
contemporary theorists‟ conception of the public sphere is glaring by its absence.  
This stands in marked contrast to the relatively vibrant public sphere of the 1970s and 
1980s which, animated by community housing groups in urban areas together with 
vibrant women‟s movement more broadly, infused the public sphere with the 
language of class, gender and wider power relations
82
. 
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It may appear something of a leap to attribute this narrowing of the public sphere to 
the relative invisibility of a once vocal and vibrant network of civic associations
83
 and 
indeed, even more of a leap to suggest that their accession to the micro policy sphere 
of Social Partnership is a factor in any of this.  However difficult this may be to prove 
conclusively, the analysis presented in this paper does point to the role of the process 
in narrowing the deliberative public sphere, thereby, at a broader level, highlighting 
some fundamental challenges in the translation of the ideals of deliberative and 
associative democratic theory into practice.  Underpinning these is the fact that „new‟ 
governance processes do not arrive into political vacuums – either institutional or 
cultural.  And clearly politics matters.  There are some useful lessons here for 
deliberative proponents and theorists.   
 
First, while associative models certainly do offer the potential to improve policy and, 
by extension, social outcomes for particular groups, in the context of a traditionally 
integral Gramscian state with a strong tradition and experience of corporatist models, 
associative models also afford states opportunities to consolidate their legitimacy and 
support for specific policies and programmes through complex lateral and horizontal 
associational networks.   
 
Second, in this same context where communication norms of bargaining and 
negotiation prevail, it may not be possible to introduce deliberation.  Or indeed, what 
is termed deliberation may in fact be something else.  Certainly, the failure of the Irish 
process to accommodate contestation and a plurality of communicative modes within 
many, if not all its institutions raises questions about the degree to which it may be 
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characterised as deliberative at all.  This in turn leads to questions as to its 
in/exclusivity.  Indeed, is it possible to superimpose or graft deliberative processes 
onto pre-existing models? 
 
Third, the problem of faction has been highlighted throughout the case study.  In the 
context of a strong Gramscian state such as that seen here, Cohen and Rogers‟ 
proposals for state intervention as a means of increasing equality of representation to 
address factional issues make little sense.  Greater equality and diversity in civic 
associational engagement will only lead to more complex, messy and conflictual 
deliberations, making securing wider public support all the more difficult.  On the 
other hand, as students of politics the world over are only too well aware, financial 
support begets political support.  Within the narrow policy and financial constraints of 
contemporary state-associational relations, it makes little sense for civic partners to 
bite the hand that feeds.  Moreover, with a weakened public sphere where the actions 
of state and civic associations alike proceed largely unremarked upon, there is clearly 
little incentive to do so.   
 
This brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of the article – does civic 
associational engagement at micro levels leave scope to engage laterally across 
associations and vertically with members and citizens thereby sustaining a vibrant, 
active public sphere?  Is civic associational engagement within micro-policy fora 
„good‟ for democracy in a substantive sense?  The answer to this has to be a qualified 
„it depends‟.  As the Irish case has shown, it depends on the nature of the state and its 
development project; it depends on its relations with civic actors across all spheres; it 
depends on the discursive and communicative norms allowed within micro-fora; it 
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depends on the interests, motivations and actions of civic actors involved; and most 
particularly, it depends on how civic participants within micro-fora interact with their 
peers and counterparts without.   Whatever the answer, the question is an extremely 
important one.  In the Irish case, civic engagement within Social Partnership appears 
to have eroded democracy.  At a broader level, as the political and economic 
contagion that was borne in a period of participatory governance spreads throughout 
the Western world, it perhaps time to reassess the democratic viability of participatory 
governance institutions and arrangements globally, turning our attention to the ways 
in which contemporary political and civic leadership may be reinvigorated, recharged 
and rendered more accountable to and representative of society at large.   
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